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Heat & Frost Insulators & Allied Workers Loc. 16 v. Lab. Comm’r; Univ. of Nev., Reno; & 
CORE Constr., 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 1 (Jan. 4, 2018)1 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: PETITIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
Summary 
 
NRS 233B.130(2)(c)(1)’s service requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional. Further, 
under NRS 233B.130(5), the district court has jurisdiction to extend time for service for good 
cause, either before or after the 45-day service period has run.  
 
Background 
 
Respondent, the University of Nevada, Reno, had a construction contract with respondent 
CORE Construction for the University’s West Stadium Utility Trench project (project). CORE 
subcontracted Reno-Tahoe Construction, Inc. (RTC) for the project.2  
Appellant Heat & Frost Insulators and Allied Workers Local 16 filed a wage complaint 
with respondent Office of the Labor Commissioner alleging that RTC had underpaid its employees 
working in the project. The University investigated and determined that the RTC had not violated 
Nevada law. Appellant objected, but the Labor Commissioner affirmed.  
Appellant then filed a petition for judicial review under NRS 233B.130(1) challenging the 
Labor Commissioner’s determination. The petition met all the requirements under NRS 
233B.130(2)(a), (b), (d), and NRS 233B.130(5).3 But, the appellant did not serve the petition on 
the Attorney General, as NRS 233B.130(2)(c)(1) requires. Accordingly, the Labor Commissioner 
moved to dismiss the petition for judicial review. 
After the Labor Commissioner’s motion, the appellant served the petition on the Attorney 
General and moved to extend the time for service under NRS 233B.130(5). The district court 
declined to consider the motion to extend time for service, concluding that the failure to serve the 
petition on the Attorney General within 45 days of filing the petition deemed the petition 
“jurisdictionally defective, such that dismissal was mandatory.” 
 
Discussion  
 
 The Court considered an appeal of a dismissal of a petition for judicial review. The Nevada 
Supreme Court reviewed de novo whether NRS 233B.130(2)(c)(1)’s requirement to serve the 
petition for judicial review upon the Attorney General is mandatory and jurisdictional, and whether 
untimely service of a petition for judicial review on the Attorney General mandates dismissal of 
the petition. 
 Nevada’s Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is codified in NRS Chapter 233B, which 
governs judicial review of administrative decisions.4 NRS 233B.130 sets forth the procedural 
                                                     
1  By Alma Orozco. 
2 RTC was removed from the appeal by the court’s August 1, 2017 Order. 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.130(2). 
4  NEV. REV. STAT. § 233.130(1); Liberty Mut. v. Thomasson, 130 Nev. 27, 30, 317 P.3d 831, 833 (2014). 
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requirements for petitions of judicial review of final administrative decisions.5 In 2015, NRS 
233B.130 was amended to include that a petition must be served on the Attorney General.6  
The Nevada Supreme Court had not previously addressed whether the NRS 
233B.130(2)(c)(1) establishes a jurisdictional requirement for petitions of judicial review. Yet, the 
court had determined that NRS 233B.130(2)(a), (b), and (d) requirements are mandatory and 
jurisdictional.7 In Otto, the court concluded that naming requirement is mandatory and 
jurisdictional because the language of NRS 233.130(2) does not suggest that “its requirements are 
anything but mandatory and jurisdictional.”8 That reasoning was further affirmed in Thomasson.9 
Thus, the court held that NRS 233.130(2)(c)(1) is mandatory and jurisdictional. As such, the court 
must dismiss a petition for judicial review if NRS 233.130(2)(c)(1) is not met, absent a showing 
of good cause pursuant to NRS 233.130(5). 
Under NRS 233.130(5) an extension of time for service is permitted when good cause is 
shown.10 Here, the district court dismissed the petition for judicial review before considering 
whether good cause existed. In Scrimmer, the court had previously determined when NRPC 4 
service is untimely, a good cause determination is within the district court’s determination.11 
Further, in Zugel, the court determined that such fact-finding function is best left for the district 
courts.12 Accordingly, the court concluded the district court did have jurisdiction to consider the 
motion to extend service time, and to make a good cause determination. 
Lastly, under NRS 233B.130(5) a party is not required to move for an extension of service 
for a petition for judicial review before the 45-day period. NRS 233B.130(5) allows a district court 
to extend the time for service for a petition “upon a showing of good cause.”13 The language of 
NRS 233B.130(5) does not limit when a party can move to extend time for service of a petition.14 
Accordingly, the court concluded that NRS 233B.130(5) does not prohibit extending the time for 
service after the 45-day period. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court reversed the district court’s dismissal, and remanded the matter to the district 
court for a determination of whether good cause existed to extend time for service on the Attorney 
General. The Court held that NRS 233B.130(2)(c)(1)’s service requirement is mandatory and 
jurisdictional. Further, the court held that the Attorney General must be served within 45 days of 
the petition’s filing under NRS 233B.130(2)(c)(1), unless the time for service is extended pursuant 
to NRS 233B.130(5). Finally, the court held that the district court can extend the time for service 
under NRS 233B.130(5), either before or after the 45-day period. 
 
 
                                                     
5  Id. at 30, 317 P.3d at 834.  
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